Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both countries are better off if the importing country is a leader, but that the follower becomes worse off if the exporting country is a leader. Consequently, the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country's leadership.
Introduction
The world markets for gas and oils consist mainly of a small number of large sellers and buyers. For instance, the U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that the major energy exporters concentrate on the Middle East and Russia whereas the United States, Japan and China have a substantial share in the imports. 1 These data suggest that bilateral monopoly roughly prevails in the oil market in which both parties exercise market power. What are the implications of market power for welfare of importing and exporting countries, and the world?
There is a large literature that attempts to answer this question by using a dynamic game. Newbery (1976) and Kemp and Long (1980) In order to overcome this difficulty, Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992 ) consider a feedback (Markovian) model in which importing countries play a dynamic game with perfectly competitive exporters. Karp and Newbery (1991) compare two situations, in one of which the importing countries are the first movers in each period while in the other of which the competitive exporters choose their outputs before the importing countries set their tariff rates. They numerically demonstrate that being the first-mover can be disadvantageous. Focusing on the Nash equilibrium, Karp and Newbery (1992) make a welfare comparison between free trade and the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium. While Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992 ) assume price-taking suppliers, Wirl (1994) computes a feedback Nash equilibrium when both the importing and exporting countries have market power. His novel result is that resource extraction is more conservative than the globally efficient level, but that the equilibrium converges to the efficient steady state. 3 His model has been extended in several ways. Chou 1 The latest data are available at http://www.eia.gov/. 2 The time consistency issue is further studied by Karp (1984) who assumes that production cost depends on the resource stock. Newbery (1981) does not deal with the optimal tariff issues, but points another type of time inconsistency when a cartel is the open-loop Stackelberg leader and a fringe of competitive producers acts as the followers. 3 In the steady state, a positive resource stock remains in the ground even though extrac- With these differences, we establish that (i) as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both the exporting country and (strategically-behaving)
importing country are better off if the importing country leads, (ii) the importing country becomes worse off if the exporting country leads, and (iii) the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country's leadership. Therefore, the important tion is costless. This is because a Pigouvian tax that corrects stock-pollution externalities chokes off the demand. 4 While Wirl (1994) assumes costless extraction, Tahvonen postulates a quadratic extraction cost function, and the other two papers assume a stock-dependent cost. 5 This concept is discussed in Dockner et al. (2000) , Basar and Olsder (1995) , Mehlmann (1988) , and Long (2010).
implication derived from our findings is that the importing country should have a leadership over the exporting country.
These findings sharply contrast to the results of Tahvonen (1996) and Rubio and Escriche (2001) that the exporting country's welfare under its leadership is the same as in the Nash equilibrium. They are also in sharp contrast to the price-setting model of Fujiwara and Long (2011) where the world welfare is highest in the Nash equilibrium. 
The Model
This section presents the model. There are three countries labeled Home, Foreign, and ROW (the rest of the world). A Foreign monopolistic firm produces and exports a good denoted by y to Home and ROW exclusively.
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In producing the good, the Foreign firm extracts an exhaustible resource.
Due to geological factors, it is commonly observed that marginal extraction cost increases as the remaining stock of resource decreases. 8 This feature has been taken into account by various authors. Our formulation of extraction cost is closest to that of Karp (1984) .
Let X be the initial size of the deposit and X(t) be the stock of resource Denote by a the maximum price that consumers would be willing to pay for the first unit of resource consumed at any t, which is called the choke price.
It is clear if marginal cost of extraction, cS(t), is higher than the choke price, it is socially inefficient to extract the resource. Therefore, extraction must stop as soon as S(t) reaches the critical level S = a/c (if X is sufficiently large so that S can reach S before exhaustion). In what follows, we assume that X is large enough so that the resource stock is abandoned before exhaustion.
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The utility function of the two importing countries is specified by 
where p is the world price of Good 1 and τ is the tariff imposed by Home. Letting y be the total supply of the Foreign firm, the market-clearing condition 9 Karp (1984) also focuses on this case. 10 In what follows, the time argument t is suppressed unless any confusion arises.
from which the inverse demand function is defined by p = a − y − bτ . Substituting this into (2) and (1), and considering that Home's welfare W consists of consumer surplus and tariff revenue, we obtain
On the other hand, the Foreign firm's profit π is
Home and Foreign strategically choose a time profile of τ and y by taking into account the resource dynamics in an infinite time horizon. Thus, the present model takes the form of the following dynamic game:
where r > 0 is a common rate of discount. The subsequent sections find the Nash and Stackelberg solutions under linear feedback (Markovian) strategies.
Feedback Nash Equilibrium
This section considers a feedback Nash equilibrium of the above game. For this purpose, let us define each player's Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. By the assumption of simultaneous moves, Home does not observe the firm's output y(t) when it makes the tariff decision τ (t), and the Foreign firm makes its output decision without knowing the tariff rate τ (t).
Assume the Home government thinks that the Foreign firm has the output strategy y = φ(S) while the Foreign firms thinks that the Home country has the tariff strategy τ = ψ(S). Then, the two HJB equations are
where V (S) and V * (S) are the value function of Home and Foreign. The firstorder conditions for maximizing the right-hand side of the HJB equations
In equilibrium, what each player thinks about the other's strategy is correct and thus we have
Substituting these into the Foreign HJB equation, we obtain
Solving the above system determining φ(S) and ψ(S) yields
Let us guess that the value function is quadratic in S because of our restriction of linear strategies. Then, the HJB equation of Foreign becomes
Equating the coefficients of the terms S 2 , S, and the constant terms on both sides of the equation, we get
In a similar way, we can obtain the coefficients of Home's value function
Accordingly, in the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (hereafter, MPNE), the strategy of each player takes a form of
Using these results, we can arrive at:
There exists a unique feedback Nash equilibrium in linear strategies where both the equilibrium tariff and output converge to zero.
Proof. The resource dynamics in linear strategies iṡ 
, the first-order condition for maximizing the right-hand side gives the follower's reaction function:
Substituting this into the HJB equation, we have
Applying this equation to the above specification of the value function, the three coefficients will be
Γ ≡ r(2bα + 2c + r) > 0.
Substituting these into (16), the Foreign firm's strategy is
Let us turn to the solving the leader's problem, which involves a few auxiliary steps. First, considering that the resource dynamics is expressed byṠ = α * S + β * , the solution is
Second, under the linear strategies τ = αS + β and y = α * S + β * , the Home welfare flow at t with the resource stock S is
where the last equation uses (21).
Third, taking the integral of the discounted sum of welfare, we have
which is to be maximized by Home by controlling α and β. Since this is just a static maximization problem, the optimal value of α and β is in principle obtained with calculus only. However, one can see that the solutions of α and β obtained through this method would depend on S 0 , which implies that such solutions are time-inconsistent. In order to overcome this difficulty, we impose a time consistency condition: the restriction that αa + βc = 0 so that the second and the third terms in (22) vanish and the first-order condition becomes independent of S 0 .
Under this restriction, the Foreign output is, from (20),
and Foreign welfare is, from (22),
With the time consistency condition, our maximization problem amounts
The first-order condition for this maximization problem is
which is equivalent to 
Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium with Exporter's Leadership
Finally, this section deals with the case in which the Foreign firm is a leader.
Supposing that the leader's strategy is y(S) = α * S + β * , Home's HJB equation is
The first-order condition for maximizing the right-hand side yields
Substituting this into the definition of the Foreign firm's profit, we have
Noting that S depends on α * and β * in such a way that
the above profit is rewritten further:
Taking the integral from 0 to ∞, the Foreign firm's objective function be-
which is maximized by Foreign that chooses α * and β * .
In principle, we can find the equilibrium strategy of the leader by seeking Under it, the welfare of the leader becomes
which is to be maximized with respect to α * . The associated first-order
which yields
Moreover, using (27), we can derive the coefficients of the follower's value
Based on these results, we can prove a result that is parallel with Propositions 1 and 2: Tables 1 and 2 report a comparison among the equilibrium strategies.
When Home (the importing country) is a leader, it chooses a lower tariff than in the Nash equilibrium. This is because the Home government is motivated to capture the Foreign rent by encouraging production. In response to this strategy of Home, Foreign (the exporting country) naturally increases production. If, on the other hand, Foreign is a leader, it chooses a lower output to seek a high price and large rent. Observing this strategy choice of Foreign, Home retaliates by lowering a tariff for shifting the Foreign rent.
These findings are well consistent with the outcomes in static games.
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( Figures 1 and 2 around here) (Table 3 around here) Table 3 summarizes the welfare comparisons among equilibria. Not surprisingly, the both countries improve their welfare as compared to the Nash equilibrium, which comes from the definition of the Stackelberg equilibria.
In contrast, the effect on the followers' welfare is different between the two Stackelberg equilbiria. If Home leads, welfare of Foreign as well as Home improves, i.e., Home's leadership entails a Pareto improvement from the Nash equilibrium. However, if Foreign leads, Home (the follower) becomes worse 11 The detailed derivations of the tables in this paper are available from the authors upon request.
12 Figures 1 and 2 depict the two Stackelberg equilibria in a static setting. In the figures, points N, H and F refer to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium with Home's leadership and the Stackelberg equilibrium with Foreign's leadership, respectively. off than in the Nash equilibrium. These welfare changes are also confirmed in Figures 1 and 2 in which static games are assumed.
The third column in Table 3 shows the welfare levels of ROW. It reveals that the presence of leaderships has a detrimental effect on ROW and that its welfare is lowest when Foreign is a leader. The last column provides the welfare of the world that is defined by the sum of the three countries' welfare. We can easily see that the world welfare is highest when Home is a leader. This is because, as mentioned just above, this case yields a Pareto improvement from the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, when
Foreign is a leader, the world welfare is lowest. The reason is that Foreign chooses a much smaller output than in the Nash case, which reduces consumer surplus of the two importing countries. As a result, reduced welfare of Home and ROW dominates enhanced welfare of Foreign, which leads to the lowest welfare of the world.
( Figure 3 around here)
Finally, we draw diagrams that depict a dynamic path of welfare of Home and Foreign. Figure 3 consists of three graphs. The top graph gives a path of Home welfare, the middle one gives a path of Foreign welfare, and the bottom one gives a path of the world welfare. The top graph tells that Home welfare is highest when it is a leader until a certain time, but after that time it is the highest when Foreign is a leader. The same observation is no longer true of the Foreign welfare: it is always highest when it has a leadership. As to the world welfare, the ranking reversal similar to Home welfare is found.
Concluding Remarks
We have explored feedback Stackelberg equilibria in a two-(strategic) country 
